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10 September

Acceptable weather was forecast for Banes and for about 75 per cent of the priority target area along the northeast coast. A mission might have been attempted if there had been an approved track, but it was on this day that the decision was reached that the four-flight program would be flown. Thus, at the time the flight would have had to go into the briefing sequence (on 8 September), no track had yet been selected.

15 September

Acceptable weather was forecast for Guantanamo and for about 75 per cent of the priority target area along the southeast coast. However, the chances were good for clearing weather over Banes. Since the Banes/Guantanamo flight was considered to be more critical than the southeast coast flight, a mission was sent to alert ~~MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM~~ on September 1⁴3th for Banes/Guantanamo. (Note: The Banes installation had not ~~MM~~ been ~~MM~~ firmly identified as a cruise missile site when the flight went into the briefing sequence.) The Banes/Guantanamo flight went to Go-No-Go on the 15th, was delayed for 24 hours because the weather had not yet cleared over Banes, and was cancelled on the ~~MM~~ 16th because the weather had not yet improved.

16 September

The forecast for September 16th predicted that the Isle of Pines/Zapata Swamps area ~~MMMM~~ would be clear and that all other tracks would be obscured. An Isle of Pines/Zapata Swamps mission went to alert on the 15th and was flown on the 17th. The cloud

cover was heavier than ~~SECRET~~ and no usable photography was obtained.

22 September

Acceptable weather was forecast for ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ the entire route of the southeast coast track, including Guantanamo. The records do not reveal why ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ a southeast coast mission was not flown; however, examination of the weather map leads to a hypothesis that is probably sound. Guantanamo was at the very edge of the predicted area of good weather. Due to the imprecision inherent in weather forecasting, there was a good chance that Guantanamo might actually be obscured. Further, Banes was clearly outside the area of good weather. Banes and Guantanamo were the only pin-point targets for the four-flight program. It is reasonable to assume that considerable urgency was attached to getting both ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ on a single flight at the earliest possible date.

24 September

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The weather forecast for the critical targets on September 24th was essentially the same as that for September 22nd. The same reasoning can be applied for the 24th as was applied for the 22nd, above.

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28 September

Acceptable weather was predicted for the Isle of Pines/Zapata Swamps track, but for none of the others. A mission to cover the Isle of Pines/Zapata Swamps had gone to alert on September 27th and was successfully flown on the 29th.

4 October

The Banes/Guantanamo mission had been flown successfully on 26 September. The Isle of Pines/Zapata Swamps mission had been flown successfully on September 29th. Thus, only two of the four tracks remained to be flown: the southeast coast and the northeast coast. Both were predicted to be clear on October 4th. The mission along the southeast coast had already gone to alert on the 3rd and was flown successfully on the 5th. The northeast coast mission went to alert on the 4th. It ~~MMMM~~ flew on the 6th but aborted because of mechanical difficulties. It was repeated successfully on the 7th.

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